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by Willard C. Westover 
and 
John P. Carroll 
This article is not intended as a technical article on bank 
auditing procedures. Its purpose is to show the deficiencies 
commonly found within a bank's internal control procedures 
and to clarify the role of bank examinations by regulatory 
authorities in preventing bank defalcations. 
IN NOVEMBER, 1952, THE UNITED STATES INVESTOR MAGAZINE PUB-
LISHED the complete text of a speech by Lester A. Pratt which he 
delivered before the Iowa State Banking Association1. Mr. Pratt both 
congratulated and cautioned the association when he remarked: "This 
is a good record, and you might relax with a satisfied smile if some 
proof could be obtained that no undisclosed embezzlements now exist 
in your banks. Embezzlements may be likened to icebergs. The poten-
tial danger lurks beneath the surface, unseen and undiscovered until 
the crash comes with its usual fatal consequences." 
As you have probably read, in January 1961 the crash came in the 
little town of Sheldon, Iowa when the assistant cashier of the Sheldon 
National Bank, who is also the daughter of the president, confessed to 
the embezzlement of $2,126,850.10 over a long period of years. This 
loss is even more astounding when we consider that it is the largest 
amount embezzled from a commercial bank in the United States. It is 
noteworthy for one other reason—the amount embezzled exceeded the 
total assets reported by the bank in its last annual report. 
Obviously, this warning several years ago to the Iowa bankers was 
warranted, for at the moment it was voiced, the irregularities at the 
Sheldon National Bank undoubtedly had begun. That this warning has 
application on a national basis is readily seen by the growing number 
of defalcations shown on the chart. Reported cases increased from 270 
in 1946 to 608 in 1951, while in the fiscal year of 1959 alone, a total 
of 1,771 defalcations was reported to NAB AC (National Association 
of Bank Auditors and Comptrollers), (cont'd next page) 
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1. Lester A. Pratt, "Still Better Audit Control," 
United States Investor, November 1952. 
What can be done to stop the upward trend of bank defalcations? 
The following are the usual lines of defense: 
1. Internal control 
2. Internal audit 
3. Directors' examinations 
4. Federal and state bank examinations 
These defenses appear adequate and, to the uninformed, negate the 
requirement for an independent audit by a recognized CPA firm. On 
closer examination, however, we discover many weaknesses which can 
be overcome by utilizing the knowledge and skills of the public account-
ing profession. 
Internal Control 
As accountants and auditors we are familiar with the objectives of 
internal control in safeguarding assets and in developing accurate 
accounting data. Good internal control is a preventative measure in 
the battle against defalcations. While audit may reveal that securities 
held as collateral have been misappropriated, adequate internal control 
(in this instance dual control) should help prevent the opportunity for 
theft—barring, of course, the possibility of collusion. 
There is no doubt that many larger banks have good internal control; 
neither is there much doubt that many small and medium sized banks 
have poor internal control. The growth record of defalcations offers 
tangible evidence that this is the case. The opportunities to have good 
internal control are greater in a large organization where individual 
employees perform specialized activities. However, many of the prin-
ciples of good internal control have application regardless of size. 
Basic control features such as annual vacations, rotation of duties, 
control of inactive accounts, and dual control over cash and securities 
are repeatedly neglected, although these principles are well known to 
the banking community. Regardless of the size of the bank or the effec-
tiveness of its system of internal control today, the system will de-
teriorate in time unless positive steps are taken to maintain it. 
While defalcations get the headlines, the role of internal control as 
a means of providing accurate accounting data should not be over-
looked. Management frequently looks at internal control as an addi-
tional expense without tangible benefits. Experience proves this is not 
necessarily true, since the procedures used to guard against defalcation 
frequently reduce errors which cause additional expense or loss of 
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income. For example, adequate control of record keeping and physical 
handling of securities held as collateral prevents losses caused by their 
unauthorized or erroneous release. Similarly, failure to control various 
income accounts can result in a loss of income regardless of the possi-
bilities for misappropriation. 
There are three steps in maintaining good internal control. First, a 
sound system must be installed; second, the system must be policed 
to see that it is actually operative; and third, the procedures must be 
changed as the operations of the institution change. Unless all three 
steps are taken, a false sense of security may be created. Finally, any 
control procedures are only as good as the personnel who install and 
maintain them. 
Since the vast majority of commercial banks in this country (about 
11,000 out of approximately 13,000) are generally classified as small 
with total assets under $10 million, the opportunities for improving 
internal control within this group are obvious. 
Internal Audit 
While internal control frequently can be improved in any given 
organization, it is impractical to provide for any and all eventualities. 
The Continental Casualty Company, after noting a variety of ingenious 
ways in which bank defalcations were carried out, stated that "The 
average dishonest employee usually has advanced to a position of trust 
by above-average ability, ambition to progress and willingness to accept 
responsibility, coupled with faithful application to duty over a long 
period of employment." Since this is the calibre of the foe, we must 
expect equal or superior attributes (plus honesty) on the part of the 
internal auditor. Assuming the proper technical and personal qualifica-
tions, the internal auditor must have the proper authority to fulfill his 
very sizable responsibility of protecting the bank's assets. 
The internal auditor should report directly to the Board of Direc-
tors. In many small banks, the auditor or the person who acts in this 
capacity may find it necessary to co-ordinate with and report to the 
President on a day-to-day basis even though he theoretically reports 
to the Board. There have been many instances where the auditor 
reported to someone other than the Board and a misappropriation was 
concealed indefinitely. In a recent New Jersey case the auditor reported 
directly to the officer who had embezzled $400,000. It is not enough, 
therefore, to pay lip service to the freedom of the internal auditor to 
perform his functions without restrictions from management; it must 
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be a fact. At a very minimum, written reports should be regularly sub-
mitted to the Board covering the scope of the auditor's work, his find-
ings, and his specific recommendations. 
Particularly in smaller banks, it is not feasible to employ a full-time 
auditor. A survey conducted in Iowa some years ago indicated that 
only 2% of the banks surveyed had full-time auditors. Aside from the 
fact that the auditor is auditing himself where he functions in a dual 
capacity, it is difficult to develop and maintain an adequate audit 
program on a part-time basis. 
The best qualified auditor needs a complete, up-to-date written audit 
program and a schedule to be sure that all procedures are being per-
formed as often as necessary. Also essential is an adequate staff of 
technically competent personnel to fulfill the requirements of the audit 
program. Care should be taken not to place too much emphasis on 
clerical-type procedures which lack over-all effectiveness. 
The dangers present are apparent when a part-time auditor is unable 
to develop technical proficiency or prepare written programs and 
schedules, and does not report directly to the Board. More insidious is 
the danger that the internal auditor becomes so familiar with the pro-
cedures and personnel in his own organization that he tends to ignore 
seemingly minor discrepancies which might uncover irregularities. 
Even under the best circumstances, it is desirable to have the internal 
auditor's activities and accomplishments subject to the independent 
challenge of an annual review by a qualified public accounting firm. 
Directors' Examinations 
Under the National Banking Act directors of national banks are 
required to appoint annually an examining committee to make — or 
appoint someone to make on their behalf—suitable examinations every 
six months. The semiannual requirement is waived by the Comptroller 
of the Currency if an annual examination is made by a qualified certi-
fied public accountant. It should also be noted that directors of a 
national bank may become liable for losses sustained by the bank due 
to some breach of statutory requirements participated in or assented to 
by the directors or because the directors have not exercised that degree 
of care and prudence required under common law. 
There are wide variations in state laws governing directors' examina-
tions, ranging from no requirement to an annual examination by 
independent qualified accountants in the State of New Jersey. As under 
6 THE QUARTERLY 
the national banking law, however, the scope of the directors' examina-
tion is not clearly defined in state statutes. 
The purpose of a directors' examination is to have members of the 
board satisfy themselves, directly or through the use of public account-
ants, as to the financial condition of the bank. Many statutes refer to a 
review of the books, records, accounts, and affairs of the bank. Outside 
directors seldom have the intimate knowledge of bank operations 
required to make a thorough examination. Individuals chosen as bank 
directors are usually prominent in local business enterprises and are 
selected for their business experience and judgment rather than their 
knowledge of auditing. Rarely do they have the time to conduct an 
examination which is reasonably complete in scope. As a result, officers 
and employees are frequently used to make cash and security counts, 
to run loan and deposit ledgers, and to perform other audit functions. 
Examinations are often conducted at a time which will not interfere 
with regular operations such as at a month end or on a Friday after-
noon. Consequently, the element of surprise is missing. Directors' 
examinations conducted by the directors themselves are often made 
without the benefit of an audit program and without establishing simul-
taneous control over liquid assets. 
The scope of directors' examinations performed by certified public 
accountants can be complete enough to render an opinion, but these 
examinations are frequently restricted in scope to such an extent that 
the accountant is unable to do so. For example, the accountant may 
be instructed not to confirm loan and deposit balances and, therefore, 
may not be in a position to render an opinion. Many banks record their 
investment, fixed asset, and bad debt reserves and their general reserves 
in a manner which complicates rendering an opinion in accordance 
with generally accepted accounting principles. For example, the 
amounts transferred to reserve accounts may be based on tax or other 
considerations which are difficult to relate to actual requirements. 
In response to a survey of bank auditing practices conducted in 
Texas, 75% of the banks admitted that a satisfactory directors' exami-
nation could not be conducted without qualified assistance. Only a 
relatively small percentage of the banks reporting used the assistance 
of an independent auditor, while internal auditors, officers, and clerical 
employees were used extensively. It appears from this survey that many 
bank directors either are unaware of—or ignore—their responsibilities 
and their potential liabilities under national and state banking laws. 
The apparent reason for this is the reliance of the directors on the 
effectiveness of federal and state examinations, (cont'd next page) 
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Federal and State Bank Examinations 
The objectives of examinations by regulatory authorities are three-
fold: first, to determine that banking laws and regulations have not 
been violated; second, to determine that a given bank is solvent and 
liquid; and third, to evaluate bank management and bank policies. 
Bank examiners have made strenuous efforts to educate the banking 
community that bank examinations are not audits. In general, the 
examiner draws his conclusions by reviewing the bank's books and 
records as shown, but makes little attempt to determine the accuracy 
of the records. For example, cash can be counted and compared to the 
balance per books without revealing a cash shortage created by destroy-
ing a deposit slip. Confirmation of the particular customer's account 
would reveal the theft, but this procedure is not followed under ordi-
nary circumstances. Some years ago the former California Superin-
tendent of Banks, M. C. Sparling, stated in Auditgram2, "Although 
a bank may be thoroughly examined in one or two days, it could not 
be completely audited in less than one or two weeks. In all embezzle-
ments it is the concealment feature, primarily through the distortion 
of records, that generally is discovered only through an adequate audit." 
Because regulatory examinations sometimes reveal irregularities, the 
uninformed believe that this is one of their primary functions. Actually 
the magnitude of many embezzlements is the real cause of their dis-
covery. This was the case at the Sheldon National Bank where the 
embezzlement became so huge it collapsed of its own weight after 
remaining concealed for many years. Speaking from experience as a 
former bank examiner, an official of NABAC stated that the super-
visory authorities cannot find a well-concealed embezzlement unless 
they trip over it, or unless it has become too large to control. Bank 
management and bank directors' reliance on regulatory examinations 
are, therefore, unwarranted since this is not the purpose nor the intent 
of these examinations. 
Up to this point, we have shown that there are widespread defi-
ciencies and misunderstanding in the banking community as to the 
effectiveness of internal control, internal audit, directors' examinations 
and regulatory examinations in preventing and discovering bank defal-
cations. An independent examination by certified public accountants 
competent in banking can make a significant contribution toward 
closing the gaps in banks' defenses. 
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2. Maurice C. Sparling, "The Auditor's Role in Banking," 
Auditgram, June 1951. 
Examination by Certified Public Accountants 
To serve banking clients, the certified public accountant must have 
a thorough knowledge of existing procedures and reports regarding 
internal control, internal audit, directors' examinations, and regulatory 
examinations. Using this information, he can supplement these internal 
efforts to eliminate the loss of money and reputation which accompanies 
each bank defalcation. 
From our review, it is evident that banks can use qualified certified 
public accountants in any or all of the following ways: 
1. To review the adequacy of internal control and internal audit 
programs and to recommend improvements. 
2. To perform the annual directors' examination. 
3. To supervise the annual directors' examination, the actual work 
being performed in conjunction with the bank's auditing department 
or other bank personnel. 
4. To perform audits and, when applicable, render an opinion on 
the bank's financial statements. 
5. To provide other specialized services not directly related to the 
problem of defalcations such as tax advice and management services. 
Whether or not a bank can be reasonably sure that engaging inde-
pendent public accountants will disclose irregularities depends, of 
course, on the scope of the engagement. For example, a study of 
1,000 embezzlements revealed that 65% involved manipulation of 
either loan accounts or deposit accounts. These discrepancies could 
have been uncovered by direct confirmation of the accounts involved. 
Assuming confirmations on a test basis, they would undoubtedly have 
been uncovered much sooner than they were. This knowledge becomes 
useless, however, if the scope of the engagement precludes the use of 
direct confirmations. 
A defalcation of the magnitude of the Sheldon National Bank affects 
the entire banking community and is usually the result of poor internal 
procedures. Such poor internal procedures are the result of inadequate 
bank management. Part of the problem is the fact that top bank manage-
ment frequently has a background in loans, investments, or customer 
relations. Therefore, they are not always adequately informed as to 
what constitutes good internal control or sound auditing procedures, 
and they fail to distinguish the role of the independent certified public 
accountant from that of the internal auditor or the bank examiner. 
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They are not aware that the means to substantially reduce bank 
defalcations are readily available. 
The merits of a periodic independent challenge and evaluation by 
certified public accountants has long been recognized by the manage-
ment of industrial and commercial enterprises as well as by government 
regulatory bodies such as the Securities and Exchange Commission. 
However, a comparable role for certified public accountants in chal-
lenging internal accounting and auditing problems has not been recog-
nized by bank management. This situation must be attributed both to 
the accounting profession for its neglect in identifying its talents and 
to bank management for its apparent apathy toward utilizing profes-
sional services in solving problems. There is, however, an acute aware-
ness in banking of the dangers, both direct and indirect, of the growing 
number of defalcations. It is up to the accounting profession to com-
municate the vital role it can play in preventing such defalcations. 
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